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Unmaking a Murderer: The Prosecutor’s Duty
to Remedy Wrongful Convictions
RICHARD SCHMACK*
This Article will discuss the obligations and duties of a prosecutor in
reviewing post-conviction claims of actual innocence in the context of the
DeKalb County case of People v. Jack McCullough.1 In my role as State’s
Attorney, the chief prosecutor, I was required to formulate a response to the
Defendant’s claim of innocence. Ultimately, I reached the conclusion that he
was innocent of the crime for which he had been convicted, and thereafter
proactively participated in his exoneration.
This Article will begin with a general discussion of the principles which
apply to a prosecutor’s assessment of claims of actual innocence, and of evidence of innocence which may come to the prosecutor’s attention in the ab0
sence of a pending petition. The Article will then move on to a summary of
the facts of the McCullough case, and conclude with my assessment of how
those rules governed my ultimate conclusion of innocence and the disposition
of the case.
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RULES GOVERNING PROSECUTION IN THE CONTEXT OF INNOCENCE
CLAIMS

According to the Preamble of Rule 3.8 of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct and the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, entitled

*
Richard Schmack has been a practicing attorney in Illinois since 1980. He has
Reen Roth a (rosecutor and defense attorneyK and served as /tate’s "ttorney of De@alR County
from 2012 to 2016. He would like to thank his wife, Jackie, for her support and assistance
throughout the events described and in the preparation of this Article.
1. People v. McCullough, 2015 IL App (2d) 121364, 38 N.E.3d 1, appeal denied,
32 N.E.3d 676 (Ill. 2015), cert. denied, McCullough v. Illinois, 136 S. Ct. 219 (2015).
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Special Responsibilities of a Prosecutor: ;The duty of a (uRlic (rosecutor is
to seek :usticeK not merely to convict..2
This rather sparse injunction is greatly expanded upon in the Comments
on this section in both the Illinois Rules and the ABA Model Rules:
Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct:
[1] A prosecutor has the responsibility of a minister
of justice and not simply that of an advocate. This
responsibility carries with it specific obligations to
see that the defendant is accorded procedural justice
and that guilt is decided upon the basis of sufficient
evidence.3
[1A] The first sentence of Rule 3.8 restates an established principle. In 1924, the Illinois Supreme
Court reversed a conviction for murder, noting that:
;The state’s attorney in his official ca(acity is the
representative of all the people, including the defendant, and it was as much his duty to safeguard
the constitutional rights of the defendant as those of
any other citiNen.. People v. Cochran, 313 Ill. 508,
526 (1924).
In 1935, the United States Supreme Court described the duty of a federal
prosecutor in the following passage:
;The United /tates "ttorney is the re(resentative
not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a
sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially
is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all;
and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice
shall be done. As such, he is in a peculiar and very
definite sense the servant of the law, the twofold
aim of which is that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer. He may prosecute with earnestness
and vigor=indeed, he should do so. But, while he
may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike
foul ones. It is as much his duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful
conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to
2. ILL. SUP. CT. R. 3.8 (2010) (amended 2015); see also MODEL RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT r. 3.8 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2008).
3. ILL. SUP. CT. R. 3.8 cmt. 1.
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Rring aRout a :ust one.. Berger v. United States, 295
U.S. 78, 88, 79 L. Ed. 1314, 1321, 55 S. Ct. 629,
633 (1935).
The first sentence of Rule 3.8 does not set an exact
standard, but one good prosecutors will readily recognize and have always adhered to in the discharge
of their duties. Specific standards, such as those in
Rules 3.3, 3.4, 3.5, 3.6, the remaining paragraphs of
Rule 3.8, and other applicable rules provide guidance for specific situations. Rule 3.8 is intended to
remind prosecutors that the touchstone of ethical
conduct is the duty to act fairly, honestly, and honorably.4
ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct:
[1] A prosecutor has the responsibility of a minister
of justice and not simply that of an advocate. This
responsibility carries with it specific obligations to
see that the defendant is accorded procedural justice, that guilt is decided upon the basis of sufficient
evidence, and that special precautions are taken to
prevent and to rectify the conviction of innocent
persons. The extent of mandated remedial action is
a matter of debate and varies in different jurisdictions. Many jurisdictions have adopted the ABA
Standards of Criminal Justice Relating to the Prosecution Function, which are the product of prolonged and careful deliberation by lawyers experienced in both criminal prosecution and defense.
Competent representation of the sovereignty may
require a prosecutor to undertake some procedural
and remedial measures as a matter of obligation.
Applicable law may require other measures by the
prosecutor and knowing disregard of those obligations or a systematic abuse of prosecutorial discretion could constitute a violation of Rule 8.4.5
These comments are intended to explain the Rules, of course, and are
not Rules themselves. When adopted by the Illinois Supreme Court in 2010,
these rules, mirroring the 2002 ABA Model Rules, contained six specific
4.
5.

Id. at cmt. 1A.
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.8 cmt. 1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2008).
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mandatory directives, none of which directly addressed post-conviction actions. Prosecutors were mandated to never prosecute without probable cause,
(rotect the accused’s right to counselK not seek Qaivers of rights from unre(I
resented defendants, never hide evidence favorable to the defendant, never
subpoena an attorney to present evidence against a present or former client
(except in very rare and extraordinary circumstances), and to refrain from
(uRlic comments Qhich :eo(ardiNe the defendant’s right to a fair trial.6 This
was a great expansion of the 1990 rules which included only two directives,
regarding only probable cause and concealment of evidence.7
It is abundantly clear that, while not directly sayingK ;do not prosecute
people you think are innocentK. that was obviously the spirit of the Rules,
along with the obligation to be fair, even to people you believe are guilty.
However, many times the probable cause standard can be met easily in cases
where the prosecutor might have doubts about the ability to prove the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Prosecuting the case in this situation is ethical, if the prosecutor objectively believes the defendant guilty, but
certainly (roRlematic Qhen the (rosecutor’s douRt is aRout the defendant’s
guilt itself.
The ABA Criminal Justice Section Standards on the Prosecution Function,8 which are more aspirational than directory, certainly point in the direction that a responsible prosecutor should not bring a charge unless personally
convinced, beyond a reasonable doubt, of the defendant’s guilt. The following standards are particularly relevant in this regard:
Standard 3-1.2 The Function of the Prosecutor
(b) The prosecutor is an administrator of justice, an
advocate, and an officer of the court; the prosecutor
must exercise sound discretion in the performance
of his or her functions.
(c) The duty of the prosecutor is to seek justice, not
merely to convict.
Standard 3-3.6 Quality and Scope of Evidence Before Grand
Jury
(a) A prosecutor should only make statements or arguments to the grand jury and only present evidence
6.
7.

ILL. SUP. CT. R. 3.8 (a)-(f).
ILL. SUP. CT. R. 3.8 (a)-(b) (1990); see also ILL. SUP. CT. R. CODE OF PROF’L
RESPONSIBILITY Canon 7 DR 7-103 (a)-(b) (1980).
8. CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS FOR THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3 (AM. BAR
ASS’N
2017),
http://www.americanbar.org/publications/criminal_justice_section_archive/crimjust_standards_pfunc_blk.html.
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to the grand jury which the prosecutor believes is
appropriate or authorized under law for presentation
to the grand jury . . . . The prosecutor should also
inform the grand jurors that they have the right to
hear any available witnesses, including eyewitnesses.
(b) No prosecutor should knowingly fail to disclose
to the grand jury evidence which tends to negate
guilt or mitigate the offense.
(c) A prosecutor should recommend that the grand
jury not indict if he or she believes the evidence presented does not warrant an indictment under governing law.
Standard 3-3.9 Discretion in the Charging Decision
(a) A prosecutor should not institute, or cause to be
instituted, or permit the continued pendency of
criminal charges when the prosecutor knows that
the charges are not supported by probable cause. A
prosecutor should not institute, cause to be instituted, or permit the continued pendency of criminal
charges in the absence of sufficient admissible evidence to support a conviction.
(b) The prosecutor may in some circumstances and
for good cause consistent with the public interest
decline to prosecute, notwithstanding that sufficient
evidence may exist which would support a conviction. Illustrative or the factors which the prosecutor
may properly consider in exercising his or her discretion are:
(i) the prosecutor's reasonable doubt that the accused is in fact guilty . . . .
(c) A prosecutor should not be compelled by his or
her supervisor to prosecute a case in which he or she
has a reasonable doubt about the guilt of the accused.
(d) In making the decision to prosecute, the prosecutor should give no weight to the personal or polit-

[Vol. 37-3
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ical advantages or disadvantages which might be involved or to a desire to enhance his or her record of
convictions.
Standard 3-3.11 Disclosure of Evidence by the Prosecutor
(a) A prosecutor should not intentionally fail to
make timely disclosure to the defense, at the earliest
feasible opportunity, of the existence of all evidence
or information which tends to negate the guilt of the
accused or mitigate the offense charged or which
would tend to reduce the punishment of the accused.
(b) A prosecutor should not fail to make a reasonably diligent effort to comply with a legally proper
discovery request.
(c) A prosecutor should not intentionally avoid pursuit of evidence because he or she believes it will
damage the prosecution's case or aid the accused.9
Notwithstanding these rules and recommendations, we are almost
weekly confronted by the exoneration of someone wrongfully convicted
somewhere in the United States. Certainly, most of these exonerations do not
involve defendants consciously charged by prosecutors who believed them
to be innocent at the time of charging. Failed eyewitness identifications, lab
errors, junk science, overworked and/or underfunded defense counsel, knowing perjury by civilian and/or police witnesses, and dubious jailhouse confessions have all led to wrongful convictions. DNA testing10 and other scientific advances, witness recantation, and new, previously unknown evidence
or witnesses, or the confession by the real perpetrator have all led to exoneration.
However, it is certainly the case that tunnel vision exists on the part of
investigators and that there is a general readiness on the part of prosecutors
to place sometimes unreasonable reliance on the creditability or skills of police. This has often led to continued defense of these wrongful convictions in
the appellate court, and on collateral attack, long after the defendant’s innoI
cence became obvious.
"s a resultK in an effort to (rovide clarity to a (rosecutor’s duty in the
post-conviction environment, the model rules were amended in 2008 by the
addition of Rules 3.8 (g) and (h). These were subsequently adopted by the
9. Id. at §§ 3-1.2, 3-3.6, 3-3.9, 3-3.11.
10. See DNA Exonerations in the United States, INNOCENCE PROJECT, https://www.innocenceproject.org/dna-exonerations-in-the-united-states/ (last visited Apr. 2, 2017).
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Illinois Supreme Court, together with new Illinois Rule 3.8 (i), effective January 1, 2016, in the following form, along with comments:
(g) When a prosecutor knows of new, credible and
material evidence creating a reasonable likelihood
that a convicted defendant did not commit an offense of which the defendant was convicted, the
prosecutor shall:
(1) promptly disclose that evidence to an appropriate court or authority, and
(2) if the conviction was obtained in the prosecutor’s :urisdictionK
(i) promptly disclose that evidence to the defendant
unless a court authorizes delay, and
(ii) undertake further reasonable investigation, or
make reasonable efforts to cause an investigation,
to determine whether the defendant was convicted
of an offense that the defendant did not commit.
(h) When a prosecutor knows of clear and convincing evidence establishing that a defendant in the
(rosecutor’s :urisdiction Qas convicted of an ofI
fense that the defendant did not commit, the prosecutor shall seek to remedy the conviction.
MiL " (rosecutor’s :udgmentK made in good faithK
that evidence does not rise to the standards stated in
paragraphs (g) or (h), though subsequently determined to have been erroneous, does not constitute a
violation of this rule.
Comments
[7] When a prosecutor knows of new, credible
and material evidence creating a reasonable likelihood that a (erson outside the (rosecutor’s :urisdicI
tion was convicted of a crime that the person did not
commit, paragraph (g) requires prompt disclosure to
the court or other appropriate authority, such as the
chief prosecutor where the conviction occurred. If
the conviction Qas oRtained in the (rosecutor’s :uI
risdiction, paragraph (g) requires the prosecutor to
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examine the evidence and undertake further reasonable investigation to determine whether the defendant is in fact innocent or make reasonable efforts to
cause another appropriate authority to undertake the
necessary investigation, and to promptly disclose
the evidence to the court and, absent court-authorized delay, to the defendant. Consistent with the objectives of Rules 4.2 and 4.3, disclosure to a represented defendant must be made through the defendant’s counselK andK in the case of an unre(resented
defendant, would ordinarily be accompanied by a
request to a court for the appointment of counsel to
assist the defendant in taking such legal measures as
may be appropriate.
[8] Under paragraph (h), once the prosecutor
knows of clear and convincing evidence that the defendant was convicted of an offense that the defendant did not commit, the prosecutor must seek to
remedy the conviction. Necessary steps may include disclosure of the evidence to the defendant,
requesting that the court appoint counsel for an unrepresented defendant and, where appropriate, notifying the court that the prosecutor has knowledge
that the defendant did not commit the offense of
which the defendant was convicted.11
The 2008 Report of the ABA Criminal Justice Section, submitted to the
ABA House of Delegates along with the Resolution adopting the Amendments, is highly informative and bears reading in full.12 However, the following extracts are particularly instructive concerning the purpose of the two
added paragraphs:
In Achieving Justice: Freeing the Innocent, Convicting the DuiltyK the "!"’s /ection of Criminal
Justice explored the systemic causes for wrongful
convictions in our criminal justice system. Its report
made numerous recommendations for systemic
remedies to better ensure that individuals will not
11. ILL. SUP. CT. R. 3.8(g)-(i), cmts. 7 & 8 (2015).
12. See CRIMINAL JUSTICE SECTION, Changes to Rule 3.8, AM. BAR. ASS’N 3 (Feb.
2008),
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/publications/model_rules_of_professional_conduct.html.
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be convicted of crimes that they did not commit and
that the innocent will be exonerated. That report did
not address the well established ethical obligations
of a prosecutor toward innocent persons.
The United States Supreme Court recognized in Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 427 n.25 (1976),
that (rosecutors are ;Round Ry the ethics of TtheirS
office to inform the appropriate authority of afteracquired or other information that casts doubt upon
the correctness of the conviction.. Further, when a
prosecutor concludes upon investigation of such evidence that an innocent person was convicted, it is
well recognized that the prosecutor has an obligation to endeavor to rectify the injustice. These obligations have not, however, been codified in Rule
3.8 of the ABA Model Rules of Professional ConductK Qhich identifies the ;/(ecial Res(onsiRilities
of a Prosecutor.. Pro(osed Rules 7.2MgL and MhLK and
the accompanying Comments would rectify this
omission . . . .
As the proposed provisions reflect, it is important to
codify prosecutorial duties upon learning of possible false convictions. The obligations in the proposed rule are triggered when a prosecutor either
;knoQs. of neQK crediRle and material evidence
creating a reasonable likelihood of a convicted defendant’s innocence or ;knoQs. of clear and conI
vincing evidence establishing the convicted defendant’s innocence. The "!" Model Rules define
;knoQs. to ;denoteTS actual knoQledge of the fact
in 'uestion.% thereforeK indirect or im(uted
knowledge will not suffice.13
As can be seen, these 2008 additions to the ABA model rules, effective
as disciplinary rules for Illinois prosecutors on January 1, 2016, were many
years in the making. They should have served as a guide for prosecutors everywhere, even where they could not yet have formed the basis for discipline.
Moreover, they clearly serve as guideposts for prosecutorial conduct prior to
conviction, not just in the post-conviction context. They can, and should pro13.

Id. at 3-4 (footnotes omitted).
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vide the ethical prosecutors with the clear tools to fight the ;institutional disI
incentives. to acce(t ;(ersuasive evidence of an un:ust conviction..14 As
notedK Qrongful convictions are not ;self-correcting by the criminal justice
(rocess..15 Many of these cases languish for decades in endless appeals and
collateral proceeding, with the convictions repeatedly upheld because of
technically correct rulings by judges who never receive all the facts. Only the
prosecutors can readily correct their own errors, or those of their predecessor.
If they were consistently doing that, it probably would not have been necessary to increase the number of special disciplinary rules for prosecutors from
two to nine in just eighteen years.

II.

PEOPLE V. MCCULLOUGH

As previously stated, the aim of this Article is to examine my application of the foregoing disciplinary rules in the case of People v. McCullough.16
Accordingly, my aim is not to provide an in-depth account of the kidnapping
and murder of Maria Ridulph, or the investigation or the prosecution of Jack
McCullough. Books have already been written, barely scratching the surface,
and more are in the works. Television documentaries have also attempted
factual analyses, and I understand that we can expect more of these as well.17
I filed a lengthy report with the court in March 2016, detailing my conclusions and facts supporting them, but even that is by no means exhaustive.18
However, to establish context, a summary of the background is necessary.
Seven-year-old Maria Ridulph was kidnapped outside her home in Sycamore, Illinois between 6:40 and 6:55 p.m. on December 3, 1957. Her family
and a few neighbors realized she was missing around 7:00 p.m., and after
about an hour searching on their own, reported her disappearance to the Sycamore Police Department around 8:00 p.m. Beginning around 8:30 p.m., an
expanding, but poorly organized search began and continued throughout the
night. The Chicago office of the FBI took the investigation over at 7:00 p.m.

14. Id. at 5.
15. Id. (footnote omitted).
16. People v. McCullough, 2015 IL App (2d) 121364, 38 N.E.3d 1, appeal denied,
32 N.E.3d 676 (Ill. 2015), cert. denied, McCullough v. Illinois, 136 S. Ct. 219 (2015).
17. See generally JEFFERY DEAN DOTY, PIGGYBACK (2014); CHARLES LACHMAN,
FOOTSTEPS IN THE SNOW (Berkley ed., 8G96L% "nn 0’>eillK Taken, CNN (Aug. 30, 2013),
https://longform.org/posts/taken; “%?-7ours” +resents; Cold as Ice, CBSNEWS (May 24,
2014, 9:00 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/videos/48-hours-presents-cold-as-ice/; David
Hinckley, ,Footsteps in the Snow’; T) *eview, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Nov. 12, 2014, 2:00 AM),
http://www.nydailynews.com/entertainment/footsteps-snow-tv-review-article-1.2006945.
18. DEKALB CTY. CIRCUIT CLERK’S OFFICE, STATE’S ATTORNEY’S REPORT FOR CASE
NO. 2011CF000454 (filed Mar., 2016), https://www.circuitclerk.org/online-records.html (the
report, along with all other pleadings for case No. 2011CF000454 are available electronically
through the website of the Office of the Circuit Court Clerk for DeKalb County).
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on December 4, 1957, in compliance with an established protocol requiring
a twenty-four-hour period to invoke federal jurisdiction.
The FBI established a temporary headquarters at a Sycamore motel and
interviewed hundreds of witnesses and suspects using agents from both the
Rockford and Chicago offices. BntervieQs Qith Maria’s family and neighRors
convincingly established that Maria had gone out to play with a friend, Kathy
Sigman, at around 6:00 p.m. They played at the corner of Center Cross Street
and "rchie PlaceK tQo doors from Maria’s homeK in the com(any of a Tom
Braddy, who was delivering fuel oil to the house at the corner, until he left
between 6:15 and 6:20 p.m. They were seen playing at about that time by
Maria’s motherK returning from an errandK and at 4:7G (.m. Ry three teenage
neighRors of @athy’sK (laying alone at the corner. Maria returned home at
6:40 p.m., according to her mother, in order to get a doll. According to her
father, the 6:30 p.m. episode of Cheyenne was airing while Maria was in the
house.19
This was the last time that she was seen by her family. She returned to
the corner where Kathy was waiting with a man, previously unknown to either of them. According to Kathy, Maria showed her doll to the man, who
had identified himself as ;AohnnyK. and Aohnny then gave Maria a (iggyback ride, the second one he had given her that evening. 20 Kathy then went
to her home to get mittens, and returned to find Maria and Johnny gone.21
She returned to the Ridulph home looking for Maria, then went out again to
see if she could find her playmate.22 The Ridulphs were not immediately
alarmedK Recause @athy did not mention a stranger. @athy’s Rrother :oined
her at the corner, having promised to come out and play when she had been
home getting mittens.23 They searched briefly together, and then returned to
the Ridulph home. Although the stranger was not yet mentioned, the Ridulphs began to look for Maria. All the Ridulphs and the Sigmans, as well as
the next-door neighbors, the Strombons, concurred with this occurring at
7:00 p.m., when interviewed separately by FBI agents.
Based on all these interviews, and other reports by neighbors, the FBI
reached the conclusion that Maria must have been abducted in the 6:45 to
6:55 p.m. window. Although the Ridulphs personally searched for Maria,
@athy did not disclose the (resence of a stranger to her family and Maria’s
family until approximately 7:15 p.m., and the Ridulphs did not notify the
Sycamore Police until sometime between 8:00 and 8:10 p.m. 24 In all subsequent investigations of potential suspects, the ability of the subject to account
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

0’>eillK supra note 17.
McCullough, 38 N.E.3d at 7.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 8.
0’>eillK supra note 17.
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for his or her whereabouts between 6:30 and 7:00 p.m. on December 3, 1957,
was an absolute key factor.
Among those evaluated as a suspect was John Samuel Cherry, an eighteen-year-old neighbor. His mother, Eileen McCullough Cherry, had married
his step-father, Ralph Tessier, in England during WWII, and John had lived
in Sycamore under the name Tessier throughout his youth after coming to
America. His parents had brought his name up when the FBI visited their
home during a general canvas of the neighborhood on December 8, out of
concern that he might become a suspect because his name was John, and he
loosely fit a descri(tion of the unknoQn suR:ect ;Aohnny..25
They told the FBI that John had been in Chicago most of the day on the
second and the third, going through physicals and other testing in order to
enlist in the Air Force.26 He had taken the train to Rockford on the afternoon
of the thirdK and had made a collect call to his (arents’ home from Rockford
around 7:00 p.m. to solicit a ride home.27 John confirmed this in an interview
with the FBI, also on December 8,28 and provided considerable detail about
his activities in both Chicago and Rockford. These included contacts that he
had with military personnel in Rockford, at the Main Post Office, also home
to several other federal departments including his Air Force recruiter and the
FBI.29
The FBI confirmed Aohn’s account Qith "ir Eorce (ersonnel in RockI
ford, determined that the phone call was placed from Rockford at 6:57 p.m.
through the local phone company to Sycamore, and administered a polygraph
examination on John, which showed no signs of deception.30 Based on all
this information, it was concluded that he could not have been involved in
the kidnapping.31 Shortly thereafter he was inducted into the Air Force and
departed for basic training.32
The investigation continued under the direction of the FBI until April
9152K Qhen Maria’s Rody Qas found in Qoods :ust Qest of WoodRineK Bllinois
in eastern Jo Daviess County.33 The location was about one-hundred miles
west-northwest of Sycamore. Lacking evidence that Maria had been taken
across state lines, and no ransom demand having been made, federal jurisdiction terminated and the FBI turned the investigation over to the Illinois State
Police.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

McCullough, 38 N.E.3d at 10.
Id. at 9-10.
Id. at 10.
0’>eillK supra note 17.
McCullough, 38 N.E.3d at 10.
0’>eillK supra note 17.
0’>eillK supra note 17.
0’>eillK supra note 17.
McCullough, 38 N.E.3d at 8.
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One avenue that the State Police pursued was to inquire into everyone
from northern Illinois who enlisted shortly after the abduction. The name of
John Tessier was provided by his recruiter along with the fact that the FBI
had already investigated him. The State Police confirmed this with Assistant
/tate’s "ttorney Aames !oyle in /ycamore Qho indicated that his office conI
sidered Tessier to have been cleared.
By the time the State Police took over the investigation, the FBI had
already investigated leads on close to two-hundred subjects, without success.34 A few seemed like good suspects but over time were cleared, either
because of ironclad alibis, or their exclusion by the sole witness, Kathy Sigman. The State Police were never able to solve the crime, although both the
State Police and the Sycamore Police continued to consider the dwindling
tips as the years passed.
In 2008, shortly after the death of Ralph Tessier, the State Police received a call from Janet Tessier, half-sister of John Tessier.35 Janet Tessier
claimed that her mother had implicated John in a conversation with Janet and
her sister Mary Pat shortly before Eileen Tessier’s death in 9116.36 Although
she claimed to have contacted the Sycamore Police in 1994 and the FBI in
1996 or 1997, those agencies do not appear to have any records of these contacts. The State Police re-opened the investigation expressly to consider John
Tessier as a suspect.
By this time, John Tessier was known as Jack McCullough, having
ado(ted his mother’s maiden name during the 911Gs.37 He had been living in
Seattle since being discharged from the military after the Vietnam War.38 It
does not appear that he was ever a suspect in the Ridulph murder between
Reing cleared in 9153 and his sister’s ti( to the Bllinois /tate Police in 8GG2.
In 2010, the State Police assembled a photo array of six black and white
head-shots of young men around the same age as John Tessier had been in
1957. Five were Sycamore High School yearbook photos of graduating seniors in coat and tie. Tessier was casually attired. The investigators knew
which photograph was the suspect, a practice barred by statute two years
later. The array was shown to sixty-one-year-old Kathy Sigman, who had last
observed the kidnapper when she was eight years old, on a dark street for a
few minutes. After four minutes and several side-by-side viewings of three
of the photos, she identified TessierK Ry saying ;that’s him..39
The photo array was shown to Sigman after a meeting one week earlier
in which she was apparently advised that the State Police had a viable suspect. By this time, the State Police had obtained all surviving FBI records
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

0’>eillK supra note 17.
McCullough, 38 N.E.3d at 9.
0’>eillK supra note 17.
See generally LACHMAN, supra note 17.
See generally LACHMAN, supra note 17.
0’>eillK supra note 17.
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and were fully aware of the evidence, which had excluded McCullough
(Tessier) in 1957.
Bn the summer of 8G99K folloQing the election of a neQ /tate’s "ttorneyK
the investigators traveled to Seattle to interview McCullough. An arrest warrant was obtained from the King County courts and McCullough was interrogated in the Seattle Police Department. He steadfastly maintained his innocence, and after several hours, invoked his right to counsel.
He waived extradition and was returned to Illinois for trial. While awaiting trial for Maria Ridul(h’s murder he Qas indicted for ra(e Rased on alleI
gations of a sexual assault in 1961, which one of his sisters had made during
a /tate Police intervieQ in 8GG1. The charge Qas filed des(ite the sister’s
request that the State not file these charges. He was acquitted of rape following a bench trial in the spring of 2012.40
The murder case proceeded to a bench trial in September 2012. Testimony concerning Fileen Tessier’s alleged statements Qas admitted Mlater
deemed in error by the appellate court), while all the FBI reports were excluded as inadmissible hearsay not covered by the public records exception
(upheld by the appellate court) or the ancient documents exception (deemed
in error by the appellate court).41 The /tate’s case consisted primarily of the
Sigman identification and the testimony of three jailhouse informants.
McCullough was convicted of murder and sentenced to life in prison, with
the possibility of parole under 1957 law. The sentencing took place on December 10, 2012, one week after I took office and was handled by one of the
members of the original prosecution team.
Appeal followed, in which the matter was handled by the Illinois Office
of the "((ellate Defender and the /tate’s "ttorney’s "((ellate Prosecutor.
Owing to the incredible case load in those offices and chronic underfunding,
the time between filing of the Notice of Appeal and Oral Argument was just
short of two years. The appellate court upheld the verdict, holding all the
defects which it found in the trial to have Reen ;harmless errorK.42 and Defendant’s Petition for ?eave to "((eal Qas turned doQn Ry the Bllinois /uI
preme Court in the spring of 2015.
McCullough promptly filed a pro se post-conviction petition back in
circuit court alleging actual innocence, newly discovered evidence, and prosecutorial misconduct. Under Illinois law such a petition is evaluated by the
circuit court :udgeK Qithout a re'uirement of (artici(ation Ry the /tate’s "tI
torney. This is commonly referred to as Stage One. Prosecution typically
40. Jeanne Tessier, Letters to the Editor, Guest View: Rape Case Against McCullough
a ,revictimization’, DAILY CHRON. (Apr. 14, 2012), http://www.daily-chronicle.com/2012/04/13/guest-view-rape-case-against-mccullough-a-revictimization/apaauas/?page=2.
41. People v. McCullough, 2015 IL App (2d) 121364, ¶ 106, 38 N.E.3d 1, 27.
42. Id. at 34.
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does not become involved unless the court rules that the petition is not patently frivolous and advances it to Stage Two, at which time counsel is appointed for the defendant, usually resulting in the filing of an amended, more
lawyerly, petition.
Anticipating this as a realistic possibility, I began a complete review of
all discovery in the case as well as the transcripts of the two grand juries and
the trial. This was necessary because none of the attorneys who prosecuted
the case were still employed by me. It is typical for the prosecutors who handled the original trial to be assigned to post-conviction petitions owing to
their familiarity with the file. While this may be acceptable in cases involving
only claims of procedural errors by the court or newly discovered evidence,
my experience in this case convinces me that where allegations of prosecutorial misconduct are raised, the case should always be reviewed by prosecutors who were not involved, in either the trial or the direct appeal.

III.

PROOF OF INNOCENCE

B had Qatched McCullough’s trial in 8G98 and read the eight (ages of
FBI reports which were attached to the defense motion in limine seeking admission of the 1957 reports as public records and/or ancient documents. I was
left with doubts as to his guilt as a result. Police reports are generally deemed
reliable by prosecutors in making charging decisions and are admissible hearsay before grand juries. They are prohibited from use at trial because of constitutional due process related to the confrontation clause, not due to any perceived unreliability. It seemed that the reports showing McCullough to have
been somewhere in Rockford at 6:57 p.m. on December 3, 1957 were reliable
on their face. However, the testimony at trial regarding the time of the abduction Qas vagueK referencing terms like ;after dinner. and ;around siOK.
certainly leaving the possibility of an earlier abduction. This could have enabled McCullough to kidnap Maria Ridulph in Sycamore and drive her to
some location in Rockford in time to make the 6:57 p.m. call.
FBI reports, which conclusively show a far more definitive time of the
kidnapping between 6:45 and 6:55 p.m., had not been attached as exhibits,
and were not part of the public record available at the time of the trial, nor
part of the record available to the appellate court. Limited review of those
records while the case was on appeal had already raised further issues about
the validity of the conviction in my own mind. However, the appellate court
ruled that the trial judge could reasonably have found the testimony of the
defendant’s sisterK that she oRserved a search involving at least a doNen (olice
vehicles at around 7:00 p.m., to be convincing. A search in full swing at that
time, together with testimony from the victim’s Rrother and @athy /igman
regarding the activities before police involvement, implies an abduction at
4:GG (.m.K if not earlier. This Qould su((ort the a((ellate court’s ruling that
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the aliRi evidence concerning defendant’s activities in RockfordK Qhile arguably admissible under the ancient documents rule, was irrelevant to provide
an alibi and thus properly barred.
Very early in my review of the discovery, however, I found the DeKalb
County /heriff’s 0ffice re(ort of callK indicating that Maria had not been reported missing until 8:00 p.m. Clearly, there had not been a dozen police cars
at the corner of Archie and Center Cross at 7:00, or even 8:00 on December
3, 1957. This was a smoking gun, completely undercutting the testimony of
a key prosecution witness on whose testimony the appellate court had placed
great reliance.
As my review proceeded, I found a great deal more information. The
time of the /heriff’s re(ort of call Qas suRstantiated Ry the E!B intervieQs
with the Sycamore Police Chief, and the victim’s (arents and older sistersK
all of whom gave similar accounts of the time Maria was first reported missing. TQo of the defendant’s sistersK from 8GG2 through 8G98K told the /tate
Police, a grand jury, and the trial court that their mother had lied to police
and provided the false alibi that defendant was home all night. In fact, in their
interview with the FBI in 1957, both their parents stated that the defendant
was in Rockford on the evening of December third. Jailhouse informants
claimed defendant had confessed to them in 2011 and 2012 and that part of
the confession involved him hiding Maria’s Rody in the Tessier home. Vet
his sisters testified that he was never in the home that night at all, and that
they certainly would have seen him if he had been.
In addition, by the time of my review, at least one of the three informants
was trying to enforce promises that he claimed were made by the prosecution
when he had testified at trial that there were no promises.
Review of the application for warrant presented to the King County
court Qhich enaRled defendant’s 8G99 arrestK to Regin QithK contained nuI
merous demonstrably false statements regarding the 1957 reports.43 An accurate recitation would clearly have shown that all the ancient documents
indicated a kidnapping around 6:50 p.m. and a phone call by the defendant
at 6:57 p.m. from a location at least 30 miles away.44 Instead, the judge was
told that Maria Ridulph was already missing at 6:15 p.m., if not earlier.45
Similarly, it was clear that the 1957 reports, admissible hearsay before
a grand jury, were never provided to either grand jury. Instead, through summary by a State Police witness who had read the reports, they were distorted
and taken out of context, so that their exculpatory nature was concealed from
both grand juries. This information made it increasingly obvious there had
43. DEKALB CTY. CIRCUIT CLERK’S OFFICE, STATE’S ATTORNEY’S REPORT FOR CASE
NO. 2011CF000454, Exhibit 1 (filed Mar. 24, 2016), https://www.circuitclerk.org/online-records.html.
44. Id.
45. Id.
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been considerable exculpatory information, either concealed from the trier of
fact or unavailable due to an erroneous ruling on its admissibility. As I continued to review all available information, I found nothing which supported
the defendant’s guilt.
Meanwhile, the addition of Rules 3.8(g) and 3.8(h) to the Illinois Rules
of Professional Conduct was proceeding through the review and hearing process, having been recommended by the Illinois Supreme Court. Its adoption
being a foregone conclusion, I determined that I should analyze McCullough
as though it were already in force. Indeed, I directed my assistants to conduct
the affairs of their office under that premise.
Returning to the 2008 Report of the ABA Criminal Justice Section, we
see that:
The obligation to avoid and rectify convictions of
innocent people, to which the proposed provisions
give expression, is the most fundamental professional obligation of criminal prosecutors. The inclusion of these provisions in the rules of professional conduct, rather than only in the provisions of
the ABA Standards Relating to the Administration
of Justice, which are not intended to be enforced,
will express the vital importance that the profession
places on this obligation. Further, it is important not
simply to educate prosecutors but to hold out the
possibility of professional discipline for lawyers
who intentionally ignore persuasive evidence of an
unjust conviction. Prosecutors’ offices have institu0
tional disincentives to comport with these obligations and, as courts have recognized, their failures
are not self-correcting by the criminal justice process. Codification of the obligations, which are
meant to eO(ress (rosecutors’ minimum responsibilities, will help counter these institutional disincentives.46
The Rule and Comments are designed to provide
;clear guidance to (rosecutors concerning their
minimum disciplinary responsibilities, with the expectation that, as ministers of justice, prosecutors
routinely will and should go beyond the disciplinary
minimum..47 In many instances, a prosecutor will
46.
47.

CRIMINAL JUSTICE SECTION, supra note 12, at 4-5 (emphasis added).
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SECTION, supra note 12, at 5.
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receive information about a defendant that does not
trigger the rule’s disclosure oRligation and Qill Re
called upon to decide whether that information is
nevertheless sufficient to require some investigation. The quality and specificity of the information
received by a prosecutor often will vary dramatically, and it is expected that a prosecutor will decide
whether and how to investigate based upon a good
faith assessment of the information received. In
some cases, the prosecutor may recognize the need
to reinvestigate the underlying case; in others, it
may be appropriate to await development of the record in collateral proceedings initiated by the defendant.48
By September 2015, I had completed review of all existing discovery,
grand jury and trial transcripts, and a considerable body of media reports
which included interviews with some witnesses that expanded on their trial
testimony. I had reached the conclusion that all this material, taken together,
(roRaRly raised ;a reasonaRle likelihood that a convicted defendant did not
commit an offense of which [he] was convicted . . .. in the Qords of Rule
3.8(g).49 However, it also appeared that there was one piece of evidence never
sought by police or prosecutors which could tip this analysis the other way,
or which might meet the higher standard of 3.8(h).
The FBI had known the Rockford telephone number from which John
Tessier called his parents at 6:57 p.m. that night.50 Investigators and prosecutors had conceded the call was made in pre-trial proceedings and in public
interviews after the conviction. They speculated, however, that he made the
call from some location other than the downtown Post Office. Some location
closer to Sycamore, but served by the Rockford telephone company, Illinois
Bell. Some location to which he could possibly have gotten with Maria, alive
or dead, if the kidnapping occurred at 6:15 p.m., in time to make the call at
6:57 p.m. No reasonable person, familiar with the area, could possibly conclude that someone could commit a murder, transport the body to a car, reach
the downtown Post Office, park the car, and enter the building in that brief
time period. However, nothing in the discovery tendered to the defense indicated that any attempt had been made to uncover the actual location of this
telephone.
48. CRIMINAL JUSTICE SECTION, supra note 12, at 5-6.
49. ILL. SUP. CT. R. 3.8(g) (2015).
50. DEKALB CTY. CIRCUIT CLERK’S OFFICE, STATE’S ATTORNEY’S REPORT FOR CASE
NO. 2011CF000454, at 1 (filed Mar. 24, 2016), https://www.circuitclerk.org/online-records.html.
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Proof that the phone was in the downtown Post Office would meet the
;clear and convincing.51 evidence standard of Rule 3.8(h) to mandate that I
;seek to remedy the conviction..52 Proof that it was not in or near the post
officeK on the other handK Qould com(letely undercut the defendant’s aliRiK
and regardless of the irregularities of his prosecution, show there was not a
reasonable likelihood of wrongful conviction.
Moreover, at this point, avoiding pursuit of this evidence because of the
(ossiRility that it Qould ;damage the (rosecution’s case or aid the accused.
would have contradicted Standard 3-3.11(c).53 I sought the assistance of the
Sycamore Police Department in this regard, as my own office did not have
an in-house investigator.54 They deferred to the Illinois State Police, the lead
investigating agency. I was verbally advised that the State Police had indeed
looked into this issue, and concluded that they could not determine the phone
number of the pay phone at the downtown Post Office. This investigation had
never been documented in writing, but I was advised that it consisted of
speaking with representatives of the Rockford Park District, current owners
of the building. Supposedly, their financial records did not indicate the number of the pay phone, which had been removed sometime after they took
ownership of the building. No explanation was offered for not contacting
AT&T to see if they had records. This seemed like an odd omission, since
the phone company might actually have known the exact location to which
that phone number was assigned in 1957.
I asked the State Police to make contact with AT&T, and was subsequently advised by their legal counsel that they considered the case to be
closed and would not investigate the matter for me. This situation is a striking
eOam(le of the ;institutional disincentives. (reviously mentionedK endemic
in police agencies as well as prosecutor’s offices.
Being obligated to investigate, I did so myself, with assistance from the
investigator employed by our Public Defender. AT&T confirmed that the
phone number in question had indeed been assigned to the downtown Post
Office for many years. A subpoena from my office resulted in documentation
of this fact. Conversations with Rockford Park District disclosed recollections diametrically opposed to that of the State Police investigators. I was
told that the Park District records confirmed that they had that phone number
on their billing statement, and that they had told the State Police the same
thing.
51. ILL. SUP. CT. R. 3.8(h) (2015).
52. Id.
53. CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS FOR THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION, supra note 8, at
§ 3-3.11(c).
54. CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS FOR THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION, supra note 8, at
§ 3-2.4. The ABA Standards on the Prosecution Function recommend employment of investigators Ry (rosecutor’s officesK Rut the De@alR County !oard chose not to (rovide funding for
an investigator when I requested it early in my term.
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EXONERATION

The documentary evidence provided by AT&T convinced me that there
Qas no theory of the defendant’s guiltK Qhich could Re reconciled to the
known evidence showing his innocence. Under Rule 3.8(h), I was bound, on
pain of professional discipline, to seek to remedy his wrongful conviction.
Moreover, it was obviously the right thing to do. Had the defendant not had
a petition pending, filed under 735 ILCS 5/2-1401, which I was required to
answer, I would have been obligated to file such a petition myself in order to
vacate his conviction.
Therefore, on March 24, 2016, I filed an answer to his petition for relief,
which admitted his allegation of innocence and :oined ;in Defendant’s (ro
se motion to set aside the judgment of guilty in this cause, as compelled by
my Rule 7.2MhL oRligation to seek remedy of Qrongful convictions.. "long
with the answer, I filed a thirty-four-page report for the purpose of making
the disclosures to the court and to the defendant as required by Rule 3.8(g).55
In the introduction to this report I summarized my assessment of a prosecutor’s oRligations under Rules 7.2MgL and MhL as folloQs:
Rules 3.8 (g) and 3.8 (h) have only been in effect in
Illinois for three months, so there is little precedent
for a report such as this. The purpose and spirit of
these new rules is obvious. They address with clarity the tragedy of wrongful convictions and provide
a clear guide for prosecutors in evaluating a claim
of actual innocence. I have concluded that a prosecutor is bound to consider personal knowledge and
experience in life as well as the discovery in a case.
The prosecutor is not a court, and is not bound by
any prior determination of fact, if he or she knows
that determination to be incorrect, wherever that
knowledge originates. In short, the prosecutor can
never leave his or her common sense out of the
equation. The progress of a case from charging,
through pre-trial, trial, appellate and post-judgment
(hases never lessens a (rosecutor’s (rimary oRligaI
tion to seek justice rather than conviction.56

55. ILL. SUP. CT. R. 3.8(g).
56. DEKALB CTY. CIRCUIT CLERK’S OFFICE, STATE’S ATTORNEY’S REPORT FOR CASE
NO. 2011CF000454, at 1 (filed Mar. 24, 2016), https://www.circuitclerk.org/online-records.html.
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After the filing of my answer, Charles Ridulph, brother of Maria Ridulph, sought to intervene in the case, to have me removed as prosecutor. Associate Audge William !rady recogniNed him as an ;interested (arty. under
the Bllinois /tate’s "ttorney’s "ctK giving him standing to file such a (etitionK
Rut (roceedings on McCullough’s (etition Qere not stayed.
Shortly after this filing, volunteer attorneys from the firm of Jenner &
Block entered the case on behalf of McCullough. His conviction was vacated
on April 15, 2016, and he was released on his own recognizance. I filed a
motion to dismiss, which Judge Brady granted on April 22, 2016, and
McCullough was able to return home to Seattle a few days later.
Proceedings continued on the Ridulph petition, which I vigorously contested. It was, and remains, my view that if victims or their families could
easily obtain replacement of prosecutors who become convinced of the defendant’s innocence it Qould render Rule 7.2MhL a dead letter. MoreoverK it
Qould Re a mockery of the /u(reme Court’s ruling in Berger v. United
States57, since it would redefine the prosecution function from representing
the People (including the defendant) to representing victims only.
The Roderick MacArthur Justice Center,58 represented by Quarles and
Brady, sought, and was granted, leave to intervene as a Friend of the Court,
supporting my position. Ultimately, following a hearing on allegations that I
had in some way prejudged the matter, creating a conflict of interest that
would justify my removal, the court, on August 5, 2016, dismissed the Ridulph petition. No appeal was filed. This decision closed the books on the
prosecution of Jack McCullough, but the fallout has continued and is still
ongoing, as litigation has continued on several fronts.

V.

AFTERMATH

A petition for issuance of a Certificate of Innocence was filed in the
original case, on October 11, 2016, by Russell Ainsworth on behalf of The
Exoneration Project. I admitted the allegations of innocence on behalf of the
People, consistent with the findings in my March 24, 2016 report. My successor requested several continuances, but a hearing was finally held on April
7, 2017. Judge Brady ordered the issuance of the Certificate of Innocence on
April 12, 2017, paving the way for an action for compensation in the Illinois
Court of Claims on behalf of McCullough, and clearing his name.59

57. See Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).
58. Roderick and Solange MacArthur Justice Center, NW. PRITZKER SCH. OF LAW,
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/legalclinic/macarthur/ (last visited Mar. 8, 2017).
59. Christopher Heimerman, Jack McCullough Granted Certificate of Innocence,
DAILY CHRON. (April 13, 2017), http://www.daily-chronicle.com/2017/04/12/jackmccullough-granted-certificate-of-innocence/a8h89h8/.
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"n informant Qho testified as ;Aohn DoeK. and denied receiving any
consideration beyond anonymity, subsequently claimed to have been promised a waiver of untimeliness, in his post-conviction petition that was pending
at the time he testified. In fact, he asserts that he was told to deny these promises under oath by police and prosecutors. This petition was ultimately denied
by the circuit court in 2014 due to untimeliness. His appellate defender argued that he should have received a hearing on the issue of the supposed
enforceable promise, but the appellate court, on December 22, 2016, ruled
that 1) he first clearly raised the argument in a motion to reconsider, and thus
had waived it, and 2) his contradictory, sworn testimony in McCullough was
a judicial admissionK Rarring a ;later claim that he had in fact Reen (romised
something for his testimony..60
;Aohn Doe. again attem(ted to intervene in McCullough’s criminal case
on August 11, 2016, seeking a hearing on the same alleged promises he raised
on his appeal. On October 13, 2016, Judge Brady granted a motion to strike,
but transferred the petition to a separate civil case, John Doe v. DeKalb
County State’s Attorney !'# 3* &"%. I filed a motion to dismiss on behalf of
the /tate’s "ttorney’s 0fficeK and the case remains pending. He also has a
pending federal case, filed pro se, revolving primarily around the claimed
quid pro quo for his testimony. The United States District Court dismissed
three judges, three prosecutors, and one defense attorney as defendants, but
permitted the case to proceed against certain Illinois State Police officers,
Illinois Department of Corrections employees, and one former Sycamore police officer. The case remains pending in the United States District Court for
the Northern District of Illinois, Western Division.61
After McCullough was released, Casey Porter, his son-in-law, served
Ereedom of Bnformation "ct ME0B"L re'uests on the De@alR County /tate’s
"ttorney’s 0fficeK the Bllinois /tate PoliceK the /ycamore PoliceK and the /eI
attle Police. A lawsuit against ISP and the City of Sycamore, relating to the
denial of portions of the requests, is presently pending before the Circuit
Court in Cook County, as case number 16 CH 09536. Porter is being represented in that action by Loevy & Loevy. Motions for summary judgment
have been filed. CNN has since intervened in the case, also seeking release
of documents, and multiple motions for summary judgment have been filed
by both sides.
Porter’s E0B" Qith the /eattle Police De(artment turned u( a video of
a seventy-minute interview of McCullough by Seattle Detective Irene Lau,
which was never disclosed to the defense before Lau testified against
McCullough in 2012. At the time, representations were made by the prosecution that no such video existed. The video varies substantially, in
McCullough’s favorK from ?au’s sQorn testimony. B think this revelation
60.
61.

People v. Reimann, 2016 IL App (2d) 140996-U, ¶ 34.
Doe v. Hanley, No. 16 C 50175, 2016 WL 5792679 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 4, 2016).
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alone would have required vacation of the conviction, if he had not already
been cleared.
Porter requested that my office open an investigation into possible perjury by Lau. Since Lau had been called as a witness by the DeKalb County
/tate’s "ttorneyK alReit my (redecessorK B Relieve that organiNing an investiI
gation and deciding whether to prosecute poses an inherent institutional, rather than personal, conflict of interest. Accordingly, I filed a motion for ap(ointment of a /(ecial /tate’s "ttorney in De@alR County case numRer 94
MR 271 on August 22, 2016. 0n EeRruary 7K 8G93K the 0ffice of the /tate’s
"ttorney’s "((ellate Prosecutor agreed to acce(t the appointment, and utilize their Special Prosecution Unit. The matter is now assigned to Charles
ColRurnK former Morgan County /tate’s "ttorneyK and Dave >ealK former
Drundy County /tate’s "ttorney.
Finally, on April 14, 2017, Loevy and Loevy filed an action in U.S.
District Court on behalf of Jack McCullough, against four Illinois State Police Officers, two Sycamore Police Officers, three Seattle Police Officers,
former De@alR County /tate’s "ttorney Clay Cam(Rell and tQo of his assisI
tants, the City of Sycamore, the City of Seattle and DeKalb County, Illinois.62
This case is now proceeding in the federal court in Rockford, across the street
from the post office where Jack McCullough placed the call to his parents on
December 3, 1957.

VI.

CONCLUSION

Obviously, one other thing that happened in the aftermath of the exoneration of Jack McCullough was that I did not win re-election. Certainly, all
elections are popularity contests, and in a general election where national
trends are at play, it is impossible to ascribe the outcome to any one decision
by the incumbent. In terms of personal face-to-face comments, my actions
were almost universally praised. I truly appreciate that, although I was just
doing my job. But, I was certainly aware of considerable disagreement voiced
in social media and more traditional settings. If I lost the election because I
freed an innocent man from prison, I could not be prouder of the loss. HoweverK it certainly illustrates the greatest of the ;institutional disincentivesK.
which necessitated the additions to the disciplinary rules.
In my opinion, the new rules provide ethical prosecutors with a solid
underpinning to support decisions that might be politically unpopular, but
62. "nn 0’>eillK '=$" Cold Case +olice and +rosecutors Sued for ,+ervasive Misconduct’, CNN (Apr. 15, 2017, 5:48 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2017/04/14/us/ridulphmccullough-lawsuit/; Christopher Heimerman, Jack McCullough Sues Police,Prosecutors,
Sycamore, DeKalb County, DAILY CHRON. (Apr. 17, 2017), http://www.daily-chronicle.com/2017/04/15/jack-mccullough-sues-police-prosecutors-sycamore-dekalbcounty/ah55wm6/.
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ethically required. However, I am less certain that they will have much effect
on prosecutors who are already inclined to succumb to institutional disincentives. 0ne of my favorite 'uotes is from Davy Crockett: ;Eirst make sure
you’re rightK then go ahead..63 I acted to remedy this wrongful conviction not
from fear of discipline, but because I knew I was right and it was the right
thing to do. Only time will tell if Rule 3.8(h) forces unethical prosecutors to
do the right thing, or if it simply inspires those who would have done the
right thing anyway.
However, one thing is certain. A prosecutor always stands ;TaSt the Hub
of AusticeK. to RorroQ from a cam(aign slogan used Ry my distinguished (reI
decessor as De@alR County /tate’s "ttorneyK the late "ssociate Audge T. AorI
dan Gallagher.64 On April 15, 2016, during the hearing in which he vacated
McCullough’s convictionK Audge !rady Mformerly Dallagher’s Eirst "ssisI
tant) elaborated on this concept, saying,
(Prosecutors) are in the center of everything. They have responsibilities
to all the spokes of the wheel. They have a requirement to prosecute those
who they believe sufficient evidence exists to convict. They have the responsibility to not prosecute where there is insufficient evidence even though they
may feel the person is guilty of that offense. They have the responsibility to
dismiss those cases where they believe the person is innocent.65
I would add only that no prosecutor should ever be tempted to shirk that
responsibility in the post-conviction setting. When the body of reliable evidence points to innocence, no matter how many trial or appellate court rulings have upheld a finding of guilt, the final power to correct a wrongful
conviction has been placed squarely in the lap of the prosecutor. No personal
or political consideration should stand in the way of performing that enormous duty.

63. David (Davy) Crockett, http://www.heartofsanantonio.com/Alamo/crockett.html
(last visited Apr. 2, 2017).
64. DEKALB CTY. CIRCUIT CLERK’S OFFICE, REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS FOR CASE NO.
2011CF000454, at 62 (Apr. 15, 2016), https://www.circuitclerk.org/online-records.html (emphasis added).
65. Id.

